Aviation Alerts

PLEASE NOTE: The Cessna Flyer Association posts Airworthiness Directives, Alerts and Service Bulletins as a courtesy for our members and for information only. This listing in not complete and should not be used as the official source of this information. It is up to you to do proper research on what ADs and SBs are appropriate for your aircraft. You are encouraged to contact your licensed A&P mechanic and to reference the official FAA website for correct information. http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/

This revised Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, owners, operators, and certificated repair facilities, of any propeller, or any propeller component parts, repaired, inspected, or overhauled by Western Aircraft Propeller Service, Inc. (WAP) (Air Agency Certificate #FQ6R544N) of a revision to SAIB NE-09-48. At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This Revised Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, owners, operators, and certificated repair facilities of Lycoming four, six, and eight cylinder reciprocating engines with a Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) (formerly Bendix) Series D2000 and D3000 Dual Magneto (2 magnetos with a single drive), of the possibility for the magneto to separate from the engine.

Several conditions identified could result in separation of the magneto from the engine, which will result in the loss of power.

These engines can be identified by the letter “D” in the 4th or 5th character in the engine model’s suffix.

This revision updates the Lycoming Service Instruction (SI) No. from 1508B to SI 1508C. All other information remains the same.

Most of the problems have occurred in Lycoming IO-360-A1B6D and IO-360-A3B6D engines installed on Mooney M20J-201 and Cessna 177RG airplanes, although the potential for magneto separation exists on any engine with a TCM Dual Magneto installed.

The airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This Revised Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin alerts you, owners and operators of Lycoming Engines (Lycoming) O-320-H, O-360-E, LO-360-E, TO-360-E, LTO-360-E series engines that three additional additized lubricating oils have been added to the list of oils approved as AMOCs to the requirements of airworthiness directive (AD) 80-04-03 R2, paragraph b.1. All other information remains the same.

The airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

We have determined that the anti-wear additive contained in the engine lubricating oils listed in Table 1 of this SAIB is the same as Textron Lycoming additive, LW-16702, and therefore meets the requirements of Lycoming Service Bulletins 446B, 446C, 446D, and 446E.

We approve changing to any of these engine oils as an AMOC to the requirements of AD 80-04-03 R2, paragraph b.1, with the limitations described below.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts operators, pilots, and aircraft manufacturers of possible inner tube failures made from butyl rubber by Goodyear Aviation Tires, (Goodyear).

At this time, the failure of the inner tubes is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

The Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) advises you, owners and operators of a potential failure mode of Honeywell’s RESCU 406(S) Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) with Part Numbers (P/Ns) 11513241-1, 1151324-1Mxxx, 1153046-1Mxxx, 1152892-1Mxxx, 1152890-1Mxxx, 1152794-1Mxxx.

At the time this SAIB is issued, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, owners, operators and maintenance personnel of an airworthiness concern for Piper PA-44-180 with Lycoming engine models O-360-A1H6, LO-360-A1H6 and Cessna 172R and S with Lycoming engine model IO-360-L2A installed, other engines and aircraft models may also be affected.

At this time, this airworthiness concern has not been determined to be an unsafe condition that would warrant AD action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin is written to inform pilots of normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category (part 23) airplanes certificated before 2000 of the potential hazards associated with stall warning characteristics in icing conditions.

At this time, this airworthiness concern is not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant an airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR part 39).

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin informs you of an airworthiness concern that is relevant to all airplanes certificated under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)part 23, as well as those certificated under the previous Civil Air Regulations (CAR) part 3.

This information is also relevant to any special light-sport category airplanes (S-LSA), experimental lightsport airplanes (E-LSA), and experimental amateur-built airplanes.

At this time, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has determined that this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under14 CFR part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, registered owners and operators of small airplanes, to follow established safety criteria, guidance, and data when modifying your aircraft with tires that are oversized compared to the original equipment Federal Aviation Administration- (FAA-) approved type design.

Oversized tires have been FAA approved by supplemental type certificates (STC) and field approvals on numerous small aircraft types for an assortment of reasons, such as maintaining ground clearance when installing larger propellers or improving landing performance for unique conditions.

These oversized tires have customarily been referred to as “Tundra” tires.

At this time, the FAA has determined that this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

Investigation of a recent accident highlights the need for reminding operators of part 23 certificated airplanes that oversized tire modifications require analysis and substantiation as well as periodic inspections to prevent unsafe conditions.

This SAIB reiterates the criteria to apply when evaluating the use of oversized tires and for determining the appropriate requirements to obtain necessary FAA approval.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises you of an airworthiness concern regarding a missed Global Positioning System (GPS) Non-Precision Approach (NPA), which may be caused by the Honeywell GPS sensor when no backup navigation system is available on flights greater than 5 hours.

The sensors are used in the following products:

• Flight Management System: GNS-XES, GNS-XLS, GNS-XLS Enhanced, GNS-XLS PRNAV, GNS-XLS Enhanced PRNAV, GNS-XL, GNS-XL PRNAV, GS-2100, CDU-XLS

• GPS Navigator: KLN-35A, KLN-89B, KLN-90B, KLN-94, KLN-900, KLX-135, KLX-135A, KLX-189B

• TAWS: KMH-820, KMH-920, KGP-560, KGP-860, MK-XXI, MK V, MK VII, MK VI, MK VIII, MK XXII

• GNSS: KGS-200

• IC-615: IC-615

• EPIC Radio: VIDL-G

At this time, the FAA has determined that this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This SAIB revises SAIB CE-10-38, dated July 15, 2010, by updating the models and part numbers.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises you of an airworthiness concern regarding a missed GPS Non-Precision Approach (NPA), which may be caused by the Honeywell GPS sensor when no backup navigation system is available on flights greater than 5 hours.

These sensors are used in Honeywell’s Flight Management System (GNS-XES, GNS-XLS, GNS-XLS Enchanced, GNS-XLS PRNAV, GNS-XLS Enhanced PRNAV, GNS-XL, GNS-XL PRNAV, CDU-XLS), GPS Navigator (KLN-89B, KLN-90B, KLN-94, KLN-900), TAWS (KMH-820, KMH-920, KGP-560, KGP-860, MK-XXI, MK V, MK VII, MK VI, MK VIII, MK XXII), GNSS (KGS-200), IC-615(IC-615), and EPIC Radio (VIDL-G).

At this time, the FAA has determined that this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) communicates an airworthiness concern to all owners and operators of reciprocating engine-powered airplanes that use an exhaust system heat exchanger for cabin heat.

This revision clarifies the airworthiness concern is for aircraft that use an exhaust system heat exchanger for cabin heat.

At this time, this airworthiness concern is not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant an airworthiness directive action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises you, owners and operators of the incorrect LNAV/VNAV and LNAV+V Full Scale Deflection in SBAS (WAAS) enabled Garmin Integrated Flight Decks (G1000/Cirrus Perspective/Embraer Prodigy/G900X/G950), GNS 400W/500Wseries, and SBAS (WAAS) enabled GNS 480/CNX80 units.

At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant Airworthiness Directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Lycoming Engines (L)O-360, (L)IO-360, AEIO-360, O-540, IO-540, AEIO-540, (L)TIO-540, IO-580, and IO-720 series reciprocating engines.

That AD currently requires replacing certain crankshafts in the affected engines.

This AD continues to require replacing certain crankshafts, corrects the start date of affected engine models in Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) No. 569A to the start date in Supplement No. 1 to Lycoming MSB No. 569A, dated May 27, 2009, and includes additional (formerly experimental) IO-390, AEIO-390, and AEIO-580 series engine models having affected crankshafts.

This AD was prompted by Lycoming Engines discovering that the start date of affected engine models in MSB No. 569A is incorrect and the need to include additional engine models having the affected crankshafts.

We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the crankshaft, which will result in total engine power loss, in-flight engine failure, and possible loss of the aircraft.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Superior Air Parts and Lycoming (formerly Textron Lycoming) fuel-injected engines. This AD requires removing from service, certain fuel servos. This AD was prompted by an accident involving a Piper PA32R-301. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above, except for those that are currently affected by similar action through any of five ADs applicable to Boeing products. This AD requires an inspection/records check to determine the manufacturer and part number of the oxygen mask assemblies installed, an inspection to determine the manufacturing date and modification status if certain oxygen mask assemblies are installed, and corrective action for certain oxygen mask assemblies. This AD was prompted by a report that several oxygen mask assemblies with broken in-line flow indicators were found following a mask deployment. We are issuing this AD to prevent the in-line flow indicators of the oxygen mask assembly from fracturing and separating, which could inhibit oxygen flow to the masks. This condition could consequently result in occupants developing hypoxia following a depressurization event.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires inspecting certain Lycoming and TCM reciprocating engines with certain Hartzell Engine Technologies, LLC (HET) turbochargers installed, and disassembly and cleaning of the turbocharger center housing and rotating assembly (CHRA) cavities of affected turbochargers. This AD was prompted by a turbocharger failure due to machining debris left in the cavities of the CHRA during manufacture. We are issuing this AD to prevent seizure of the turbocharger turbine, which could result in damage to the engine, and smoke in the airplane cabin.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Service experience has shown that a case of FADEC channel B manifold air pressure (MAP) sensor hose permeability is not always recognized as fault by the FADEC. The MAP value measured by the sensor may be lower than the actual pressure value in the engine manifold, and limits the amount of fuel injected into the combustion chamber and thus the available power of the engine. A change in FADEC software version 2.91 will change the logic in failure detection and in switching to channel B (no automatic switch to channel B if MAP difference between channel A and B is detected and lower MAP is at channel B). In addition, previous software versions allow–under certain conditions and on DA 42 aircraft only–the initiation of a FADEC self test during flight that causes an engine in-flight shutdown. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine in-flight shutdown or power loss, possibly resulting in reduced control of the airplane.

This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting airworthiness directive (AD) 2011-04-09 that was sent previously by individual notices to the known U.S. owners and operators of affected airplanes identified above.

This AD requires modifying the chemical oxygen generators in the lavatory.

This AD was prompted by reports that the current design of these oxygen generators presents a hazard that could jeopardize flight safety.

We are issuing this AD to eliminate this hazard.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires removing certain propeller hubs from service at new, reduced life limits and eddy current inspections (ECIs) of the propeller hub. This new AD requires removing certain propeller hubs from service before they exceed 6,000 hours time-since-new (TSN). This AD was prompted by a report of a crack in a propeller hub. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracked propeller hubs, which could cause failure of the propeller hub, blade separation, and loss of control of the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

In-flight shutdown incidents have been reported on airplanes equipped with TAE 125 engines. Preliminary investigations showed that it was mainly the result of nonconforming disc springs (improper heat treatment) used in a certain production batch of the clutch.

We are issuing this AD to prevent engine in-flight shutdown leading to loss of control of the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Service has shown that the small outlet of the blow-by oil separators, part number 02-7250-18100R1; 02-7250-18100R2; 02-7250-18100R3; 02-7250-18100R4; 02-7250-18300R1; 02-7250-18300R2; 02-7250-18300R3; 02-7250-18300R4; or 02-7250-18300R5, may cause a blow-by gas pressure increase inside the crankcase of the engine in excess of the oil seal design pressure limits. Leaking engine oil may adversely affect the gearbox clutch or the engine lubrication system. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to in-flight cases of engine power loss or ultimately, shutdown.

We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine power or uncommanded engine shutdown during flight due to excessive crankcase blow-by gas pressure.

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