Aviation Alerts

PLEASE NOTE: The Cessna Flyer Association posts Airworthiness Directives, Alerts and Service Bulletins as a courtesy for our members and for information only. This listing in not complete and should not be used as the official source of this information. It is up to you to do proper research on what ADs and SBs are appropriate for your aircraft. You are encouraged to contact your licensed A&P mechanic and to reference the official FAA website for correct information. http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for McCauley Propeller Systems model 4HFR34C653/L106FA propellers. This AD requires a onetime fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) and eddy current inspection (ECI) of the propeller hub for cracks. This AD results from reports of 10 hubs found cracked during propeller overhaul. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the propeller hub, which could cause blade separation, damage to the airplane, and loss of control of the airplane.

The FAA is correcting airworthiness directive (AD) 2010-11-09, which published in the Federal Register. That AD applies to TAE models TAE 125-01 and TAE 125-02-99 reciprocating engines, installed in, but not limited to, Diamond Aircraft Industries model DA 42 airplanes. The part number for engine model TAE 125-01 is missing a digit in paragraph (c) and in paragraph (e)(3). This document corrects those part numbers. In all other respects, the original document remains the same.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:

Engine in-flight shutdown incidents have been reported on Diamond Aircraft Industries DA 42 airplanes equipped with TAE 125 engines. The investigations showed that it was mainly the result of failure of the Proportional Pressure Reducing Valve (PPRV) (also known as Propeller Control Valve) due to high vibrations. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to further cases of engine in-flight shutdown, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aircraft.

Since the release of European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2008-0145, the engine gearbox has been identified as the primary source of vibrations for the PPRV, and it has also been determined that failure of the electrical connection to the PPRV could have contributed to some power loss events or in-flight shutdowns.

We are issuing this AD to prevent engine in-flight shutdown, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aircraft.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain AVOX Systems and B/E Aerospace oxygen cylinders, as installed on various 14 CFR part 23 or CAR 3 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect for and remove substandard oxygen cylinders from the airplane. This AD was prompted by the reported rupture of a high-pressure gaseous oxygen cylinder, which had insufficient strength characteristics due to improper heat treatment. We are issuing this AD to prevent an oxygen cylinder from rupturing, which, depending on the location, could result in structural damage and rapid decompression of the airplane, damage to adjacent essential flight equipment, deprivation of the necessary oxygen supply for the flightcrew, and injury to cabin occupants or other support personnel.

The FAA is superseding an existing emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-24-52 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of TCM 240, 360, 470, 520, and 550 series reciprocating engines. That AD requires before further flight, replacing certain part number (P/N) hydraulic lifters. This AD results from TCM reporting another occurrence of rapid wear on the face of hydraulic lifters, P/Ns 657913, 657915, and 657916, and from the need to expand the applicability of this AD to include the TCM 346 series reciprocating engines and the R-RM IO-240-A reciprocating engines. We are issuing this AD to prevent excessive hydraulic lifter wear, which can result in loss of engine power and loss of control of the airplane.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, owners, or operators of Cessna Aircraft Company Models 206 and 207 Aircraft that have installed auxiliary fuel tank bladders in accordance with Sierra Industries, Ltd. Supplemental Type Certificates (STC) SA3634SW or SA3853SW, of a potential airworthiness concern where operators may not be aware of the actual fuel quantity in the aircraft. This may be caused by not allowing enough time to let the fuel to settle through the bladders following the refueling process.

At this time, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has determined that this airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin advises owners, operators, and maintenance personnel of an airworthiness concern, specifically the possibility of frayed aileron cables on Cessna Model 172S airplanes.

At this time, this airworthiness concern is not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant an airworthiness directive action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) informs registered owners/operators of Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 414A and 421C aircraft with S-TEC Corporation (S-TEC) Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA08996AC-D (system 55/55X) with optional Trim installed, Cessna 414A and 421C aircraft with S-TEC STC SA7787SW-D (system 65) with optional Trim installed, and Cessna 414A and 421C aircraft with S-TEC STC SA7790SW-D (system 60) with optional Trim installed, of an airworthiness concern.

Specifically, this SAIB provides guidance on procedures for inspection of the rudder trim tab blocks which were relocated during the installation of the STC. This SAIB also provides guidance on inspecting phenolic blocks for wear along the flight control system.

At this time, this airworthiness concern has not been determined to be an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) is to inform registered owners, operators, and maintenance personnel of an airworthiness concern regarding heated drain masts (P/N 105881) on several Cessna Citation airplanes.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) is to inform registered owners, operators, and maintenance personnel of an airworthiness concern regarding heated drain masts (P/N 105881) on several Cessna Citation airplanes.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin informs owners, operators, and maintenance personnel of Cessna Model 402C airplanes of caution statements that will be added to the aircraft maintenance manual. These caution statements address making sure the correct washers are tagged during removal to ensure proper location at reinstallation and to make sure the same washers are properly located under the bolt head and nut when re-connecting the torque links.

At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant Airworthiness Directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

Six minutes after takeoff from a busy airport, a pilot reported smoke in the cockpit and declared an emergency. The aircraft landed without incident and all passengers and crew deplaned successfully. Maintenance determined that the hydraulic pressure did not relieve due to the nose gear not fully retracting. The nose strut did not extend completely, which prevented the nose gear from going in the up and locked position. This caused the hydraulic system to remain pressurized, which caused the fluid to heat up enough to melt the hydraulic reservoir sight tube. The hot hydraulic fluid then spilled out into the nose baggage compartment, releasing fumes into the cockpit and causing the perceived smoke.

The Model 402C uses a hydraulically actuated landing gear system. When the landing gear is locked Up or Down, the hydraulic fluid is continually circulated through the system by the engine driven hydraulic pumps at a nominal pressure up to 50 psi. When the gear is selected from one position to another, the pressure varies but can reach as high as 1750 psi. When the system is pressurized above 150-175 psi, a pressure switch in the system activates an annunciator light (“HYD PRESS”). This light indicates that hydraulic pressure is flowing to the landing gear system. Any time the landing gear is in transit, the HYD PRESS annunciator should be illuminated.

Although we were unable to verify this, the HYD PRESS light in the above incident should have been illuminated starting at the time when the pilot selected gear Up, and should have remained illuminated for an extended time because the nose gear did not fully retract.

Cessna has since released temporary revisions (TRs) to the pilots operating handbook (POH) for this aircraft with the following information:

1.    To make it easier for pilots to find the correct procedures, the procedures for “Hyd Pressure Light Illuminated After Gear Cycle” were moved from Landing Gear Emergency Procedures to Hydraulic System Emergency Procedures (this new section was created by the TR).

2.    A Caution statement was added to the Amplified Procedures to emphasize that if the hydraulic system remains pressurized for an extended period of time, the sight tube could rupture. (Previously, the POH stated without a Caution statement that damage to the system was possible).

3.    The Emergency Procedures, both the Abbreviated and the Amplified procedures, for “Hyd Pressure Light Illuminated After Gear Cycle” were enclosed in a box, making them immediate action items that are to be committed to the pilot’s memory. This point is especially important because this issue is most likely to occur shortly after takeoff, when the pilot is busy. If this were to occur, the pilot should not have to look through the POH in an attempt to find the correct procedure to address the indication; the pilot should already understand the issue and know how to resolve it.

This SAIB revises SAIB CE-10-40, dated July 27, 2010 as a result of comments received from an organization and other airworthiness authorities. It adds to the list of models potentially affected.

Recent safety information on Cessna 150, 170, and 172 series airplanes caused us to re-examine our efforts on preventing accidents and incidents due to water contaminated fuel. Water may enter the fuel tank system via any penetration in the wing fuel tank. Water in the fuel may come out of solution, settle and make its way to a drain location in the form of a blob, pea, or BB-shaped translucent mass found at the bottom of the sampler cup. Water suspended in the fuel may lead to a cloudy or hazy appearance in the sampler cup. Water may have dissolved in the fuel, but the conditions have not yet occurred to cause the water to come out of solution and perhaps adhere to the dry tank upper surface or walls (similar to condensation). Understanding this, all pilots, owners, operators, maintenance, and service personnel of these type airplanes should assume some water exists in the fuel tank system on the airplane.

Recent safety information on Cessna 150, 170, and 172 series airplanes caused us to re-examine our efforts on preventing accidents and incidents due to water contaminated fuel. Water may enter the fuel tank system via any penetration in the wing fuel tank. Water in the fuel may come out of solution, settle and make its way to a drain location in the form of a blob, pea, or BB-shaped translucent mass found at the bottom of the sampler cup. Water suspended in the fuel may lead to a cloudy or hazy appearance in the sampler cup. Water may have dissolved in the fuel, but the conditions have not yet occurred to cause the water to come out of solution and perhaps adhere to the dry tank upper surface or walls (similar to condensation). Understanding this; all pilots, owners, operators, maintenance and service personnel of these type airplanes should assume some water exists in the fuel tank system on the airplane.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires inspecting the wings for internal and external damage, repairing any damage, reinforcing the wings, installing operational limitation placards in the cockpit, and adding limitations to the airplane flight manual supplement. This AD was prompted by a review of installed Flint Aero, Inc. wing tip auxiliary fuel tanks, Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA5090NM. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage in the wings and to prevent overload failure of the wing due to the installation of the STC. Damage in the wing or overload failure of the wing could result in structural failure of the wing, which could result in loss of control.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 150, 152, 170, 172, 175, 177, 180, 182, 185, 188, 190, 195, 206, 207, 210, T303, 336, and 337 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections and replacement of parts, if necessary, of the seat rail and seat rail holes; seat pin engagement; seat rollers, washers, and axle bolts or bushings; wall thickness of roller housing and the tang; and lock pin springs. This new AD requires retaining all of the actions from the previous AD and adding steps to the inspection procedures in the previous AD. This AD was prompted by added steps to the inspection procedures, added revised figures, and clarification of some of the existing steps. We are issuing this AD to prevent seat slippage or the seat roller housing from departing the seat rail, which may consequently cause the pilot/copilot to be unable to reach all the controls. This failure could lead to the pilot/copilot losing control of the airplane.

We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. AD 2009-09-09 currently requires repetitive inspections of the rudder hinges and the rudder hinge brackets for damage, i.e., cracking, deformation, and discoloration. If damage is found during any inspection, AD 2009-09-09 also requires replacing the damaged rudder hinge and/or rudder hinge bracket. This new AD retains the inspection requirements of AD 2009-09-09, adds airplanes to the Applicability section, and adds a terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements. This AD resulted from the manufacturer developing a modification that terminates the repetitive inspections and from the manufacture adding airplane serial numbers into the Applicability section. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage in the rudder hinges and the rudder hinge brackets, which could result in failure of the rudder. This failure could lead to loss of control.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This emergency AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD requires obtaining written approval from the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), to operate the airplane. This written approval must clearly state that operation is approved per Emergency AD 2010-26-54. This AD was prompted by a Cessna Model LC41-550FG airplane that suffered a significant structural failure in the wing during a production acceptance flight test. We are issuing this AD to prevent catastrophic failure of the wing due to disbonding of the wing skin from the wing spar.

Emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2010-26-54 supersedes AD 2010-26-53, which currently applies to owners/operators of Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) (Type Certificate A00003SE previously held by Columbia Aircraft Manufacturing (previously The Lancair Company)) Models LC41-550FG and LC42-550FG airplanes that received the emergency AD by letter issued December 10, 2010.

This emergency AD was prompted by a Cessna Model LC41-550FG that suffered a significant structural failure in the wing during a production acceptance flight test. The wing skin disbonded from the upper forward wing spar. The length of the disbond was approximately 7 feet. This condition, if not corrected, could result in catastrophic failure of the wing due to disbonding of the wing skin from the wing spar. We are evaluating this situation and may take additional AD action as necessary.

During an inspection of an elevator trim installation per S-TEC STC SA08996AC-D, it was found that the elevator trim cables pass through a bulkhead with about five degrees of deflection. A phenolic block is installed to prevent wear on the bulkhead and cable. Additionally, the cable impacts the floor aft of the bulkhead. A phenolic strip is installed to prevent contact between the cable and the floor. Until recently, there were no directed inspections of the phenolic block and strip.

The S-TEC STCs have been revised to install pulleys to move the cables off the bulkhead pass through.

Also, during the installation inspection, it was noticed that the rudder trim tab blocks were not properly relocated in accordance with the S-TEC STCs. This prevented the rudder system from obtaining full travel. There was no approval for the location and installation of the trim tab blocks for this particular installation.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires inspecting the wings for internal and external damage, repairing any damage found, installing an operational limitation placard in the cockpit, adding limitations to the flight manual supplement, and reporting the results of the inspection to the FAA if damage is found. This AD was prompted by a wing overload failure and by reports of cracks in the upper wing skins on certain Cessna airplanes that are or have ever been modified by Aviation Enterprises Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA02055AT, SA02056AT, SA02307AT, or SA02308AT. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage in the wings and to prevent overload failure of the wing due to the installation of the STCs. Damage in the wing or overload failure of the wing could result in structural failure of the wing, which could result in loss of control.

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